Team formation and biased self-attribution

We analyze the impact of individuals' self-attribution biases on the formation of teams in the workplace. We consider a two periods model in which workers jointly decide whether to form a team or work alone. We assume workers' abilities are unknown. Agents update their beliefs about abilities after receiving a signal at the end of the first period. We show that allowing workers to learn about their abilities undermines cooperation when a fixed allocation of the group outcome is assumed. Consistent with the latter finding, we establish that making learning about workers' abilities less accessible increases workers' cooperation and welfare. When workers suffer from selfserving attribution, cooperation among agents is undermined whatever the allocation rule considered for the group outcome. We analyze possible solutions to insufficient teamwork. We find that team contracts based on a revelation game can improve cooperation as well as the presence of a manager in the team. Full efficiency is however never achieved. Our paper establishes a basic framework to analyze necessary psychological conditions for individuals to form teams. We apply our model to coauthorship and to organizational issues

A MODEL FOR TEAM MANAGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF SELF-SERVING WORKERS

We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers' abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers' true performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in theabsence of asymmetry of information. We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers¿ abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers¿ true performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in theabsence of asymmetry of information.

An Experimental Test of Algorithmic Dismissals

We design a laboratory experiment in which a human or an algorithm decides which of two workers to dismiss. The algorithm automatically dismisses the least productive worker whereas human bosses have full discretion over their decisions. Using performance metrics and questionnaires, we find that fired workers react more negatively to human than to algorithmic decisions in a broad range of tasks. We show that spitefulness exacerbated this negative reaction. Our findings suggest algorithms could help tame negative reactions to dismissals

Don't Ask Me If You Will Not Listen: The Dilemma of Participative Decision Making.

We study the effect of participative decision making in an experimental principalagent game, where the principal can consult the agent’s preferred option regarding the task to be undertaken in the final stage of the game. We show that consulting the agent was beneficial to principals as long as they followed the agent’s choice. Ignoring the agent’s choice was detrimental to the principal as it engendered negative emotions and low levels of transfers. Nevertheless, the majority of principals were reluctant to change their mind and adopt the agent’s proposal. Our results suggest that the ability to change one’s own mind is an important dimension of managerial success.organizational behavior, participative decision making, principal-agent model

Are you a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy? Infl?uence Costs and Contract Design.

We develop a principal-agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft signal (the supervision signal) about the agent?s level of effort. We show that the agent?'s ability to manipulate the soft signal increases the cost of implementing the effcient equilibrium, leading to wage compression when the infl?uence cost is privately incurred by the agent. When manipulation activities negatively affect the agent?s productivity through the level of output, the design of infl?uence-free contracts that deter manipulation may lead to high-powered incentives. This result implies that high-productivity workers face incentive schemes that are more sensitive to hard evidence than those faced by their low-productivity counterparts. In that context, the principal will tolerate infl?uence for low-productivity workers but not for high-productivity workers. We also fi?nd that in the case of productivity-based costs, it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent, even if supervision is costless.principal-agent model with supervision, contract design, in?uence activities, manipulation, productivity-based influence costs, power of incentives

Uninformative announcements and asset trading behavior

Financial markets are overwhelmed by daily announcements. We use experimental asset markets to assess the impact of uninformative communications on asset prices and trading volumes. We deliver uninformative messages in standard experimental asset markets and find that trading volumes and prices are impacted by these messages. In particular, the release of a pre-announced preset message to traders “The price is too high” in predetermined trading periods decreases the amplitude and duration of bubbles. Also, the release of the messages “The price is too high” or “The price is too low” reduces trading volume with inexperienced subjects

Reaction to public information in asset markets: does ambiguity matter?

We report experiments that examine trader reaction to ambiguity when dividend information is revealed sequentially. We find that experienced traders are better at internalizing ambiguity than inexperienced subjects. No significant differences are observed in the ambiguity versus control treatments regarding prices, price volatility and volumes for experienced subjects. However, relative to the control, prices are higher, volatility greater and trading unsophisticated for inexperienced subjects in the ambiguity treatment. Price changes are consistent with news revelation regardless of subject experience and the degree of ambiguity. Further, we do not find under or over price reactions to news. Regardless of experience, market reaction to news moves in line with fundamentals.Experimental asset markets, Ambiguity, Market communications, Bounded rationality

Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations.

We propose a novel approach to the analysis of organizations by developing a computerized platform that reproduces relevant features of existing organizations such as real-effort tasks and real-leisure alternative activities (Internet). In this environment, we find strong incentives effects as organizations using individual incentives significantly outperform those relying on team incentives. Combining real-time peer monitoring with team incentives, we report striking evidence of positive peer effects as production increases by 50% and Internet usage decreases by 54% compared with organizations using team incentives alone. Peer monitoring allows virtual organizations using team incentives to perform as well as those using individual incentives. However, the positive effect of peer monitoring does not apply to low performers.team incentives, free-riding, monitoring, peer pressure, virtual organization

The effect of reliability, content and timing of public announcements on asset trading behavior

Financial markets are overwhelmed by daily announcements. We use experimental asset markets to assess the impact of releasing public messages with different levels of reliability on asset prices. Subjects receive qualitative announcements in predetermined trading periods that are either preset by the experimenter, randomly selected, or determined by past asset market prices. We find that messages can play a significant role in bubble abatement, or rekindling. The preset message, “The price is too high,” decreases the amplitude and duration of bubbles for inexperienced subjects. Announcements that depend on the actual level of mispricing reduce bubble magnitude. Meanwhile, a preset or random message, “The price is too low,” prevents experienced subjects from abating bubbles. We account for the effect of public messages by showing that they significantly reduce inconsistent (“irrational”) trading behavior.Experimental asset markets, Bubbles, Market communications, Bounded rationality

The Effect of Reliability, Content and Timing of Public Announcements on Asset Trading Behavior

Financial markets are overwhelmed by daily announcements. We use experimental asset markets to assess the impact of releasing public messages with different levels of reliability on asset prices. Subjects receive qualitative announcements in predetermined trading periods that are either preset by the experimenter, randomly selected, or determined by past asset market prices. We find that messages can play a significant role in bubble abatement, or rekindling. The preset message, “The price is too high,” decreases the amplitude and duration of bubbles for inexperienced subjects. Announcements that depend on the actual level of mispricing reduce bubble magnitude. Meanwhile, a preset or random message, “The price is too low,” prevents experienced subjects from abating bubbles. We account for the effect of public messages by showing that they significantly reduce inconsistent (“irrational”) trading behavior.experimental asset markets, bubbles, market communications, bounded rationality